Carl Schmitt for the Masses: Deeper Down the Rabbit Hole of the Friend-Enemy Distinction

After introducing the idea of the Friend-Enemy Distinction in part three, we get into the heart of this idea in the "The Concept of the Political."

My previous post on The Concept of the Political can be found here:

Carl Schmitt for the Masses, pt.3: Introducing Friends, Enemies and "The Political."

Previous entries in this series include discussions of Political Theology and Legality and Legitimacy. They can be found here:

Carl Schmitt for the Masses, pt. 2: The Problem of “Legitimacy.”

Carl Schmitt for the Masses, pt. 1: The Problem of Sovereignty.”

Fighting, Dying and the Enemy

There is much confusion surrounding Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction. We often try to domesticate the category of “the political” and so miss the essence of what he was talking about in this distinction. Schmitt puts forward the idea of the “the political” and the “friend-enemy distinction” that gives rise to the political as a direct critique of modern parliamentary democracy. We hear the word “enemy” and immediately want to begin naming our most disliked political opponents and competitors as “enemies.” In today’s battles over culture, with its often histrionic language, it is relatively easy to apply the enemy label to many foes. Perhaps they are enemies, but in Schmitt’s mind that would mean something very different than the meaning we often apply to the word. A competitor is not an enemy. An opponent is not necessarily an enemy.

We have to say this very clearly at the beginning and keep reminding ourselves of this, that an enemy is someone, some “other” who is a threat to “us” such that there is a real possibility of combat where people would actually die.

“To the enemy concept belongs the ever present possibility of combat.”

Why is this important? In large part, because one of the aims of liberalism is to transform enemies into something like “competitors” as exists in the realm of economics, or into debating partners as in the faculty room. This is the essence of the perpetual conversation of liberal democracy as it sprang up in the aftermath of the Protestant-Catholic religious wars. The idea was that through the “marketplace of ideas,” engaged in and through a so-called value-neutral legal framework, an ongoing conversation of parliamentary democratic values could take place such that war and conflict could be avoided. Schmitt thought this was nonsense.

And so, he argued, we have tried to deny the political, muddying the concept, confusing it with other categories like morality, economics or even aesthetics. To recover the idea of the political we will have to rescue it from such obfuscations. Likewise, the political is not the expression of our personal emotions or tendencies, nor our personal dislikes or preferences.

Schmitt is very clear. The friend-enemy distinction may seem barbaric, like the remnant of an older time that we have transcended. We in the liberal west like to think that we have lifted ourselves above the idea of the enemy, that in our enlightened times such a thing as an enemy does not exist at all. All problems can be solved through reason and discussion. But, he argues, whether we like it or not, we always group ourselves by the categories of “friend” and “enemy.” They always exist. There is always an “us” and there is always a “them.”

He notes that this is not built out of the realm of private grudges and animosities. The friend-enemy distinction is at work when there is collective of people confronting a similar collectivity. When one group confronts another group and there is the real possibility of conflict, this is the situation in which “the political” comes into play.

“An enemy is not the private adversary whom one hates.”

Love Your Enemies?

After stating this, Schmitt, recognizing his connectedness to a long tradition of Christian thought, immediately raises an objection to the line of thinking he is wishing to put forward. What of Jesus’ call to “love your enemies” as found in the gospels (Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27)? He delves into both the Greek original and the Latin translation of these verses, citing both in the original without translation (knowing both languages is helpful here, something Schmitt assumed in his readers), making the argument that both texts speak to the personal by using the singular, rather than to the plural, thus speaking to the collective. He argues that this is a text meant to be lived out in response to personal animosities and hostilities and gives no instructions to the collective. It does not speak to the political. He further notes that while the text may call you to love your enemy, it does not admonish you to surrender to them.

He then goes on to make the case that there is a long tradition of Christian nations not surrendering in the face of those who were considered enemies:

“Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of a love towards the Saracens or the Turks.”

We have to remember that in the background of these arguments, Schmitt is attacking ideas prevalent in liberal society. On the one had he is targeting liberal democratic notions of the continual democratic conversation; but also on the other hand he has his sights set on those that would undermine the specific cultural uniqueness of a specific people. He is not one for cultural tourism, multi-culturalism, and cultural borrowing all of which he seems to view as a kind of cultural surrender before the fight even begins. In the Germany of his day, what he seems to be implying without saying it directly, is that this meant being a Christian society. Without this, it was a surrendering of something essentially German. He continues:

“The Bible quotation touches the political antithesis even less than it intends to dissolve, for example, the antithesis of good and evil or beautiful and ugly. It certainly does not mean that one should love and support the enemies of one’s own people.”

It is on this level of a people that Schmitt builds his concept of the political. It is not built on the securing of individual rights. Rather, it about the flourishing and surviving of a people as a group. This is why, in the previous essay on this subject, we began talking about the concept of “the friend” before we discussed “the enemy.” You have to have a clear idea of who “we” are and why “we” are a people. If a people cannot answer the question of what makes them a people, they will have a hard time mustering the strength to fight for this thing that they are suppose to be. It is out of this shared collective identity that “the political” is born.

Politics is only concrete when one confronts a concrete situation that potentially or actually manifests itself in a specific conflict. It is only in either war, revolution or civil war, or their real possibilities, that the friend-enemy distinction is made concrete. Until then, it is only theory. Unless there are two competing societies bumping into each other (externally or internally) such that conflict is a genuine possibility, the realm of the political does not come into play. Without this clarity, there are a whole series of words that have little or no meaning: the state, the republic, society, class, sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning and so forth. Without knowing who the “us” is and who the “them” is with clarity, there are a whole range of categories that are incomprehensible without knowing who will be affected, who benefits, who will be combatted or refuted or negated. It is only in this conflict between societies that the true interests of a society are fully revealed and made manifest. It is the real presence of the enemy and the threat of being negated that clarifies what is being nurtured and defended for the wellbeing and flourishing of the “us,” of the “friend.”

Party Politics?

Domestically, we often use “the political” interchangeably with “party politics.” Schmitt argues that the degree to which domestic antagonisms foster a true friend-enemy distinction, is the degree to which they are weakening the state. The intensification of internal antagonisms has the effect of eroding the common identity of the people. If domestic conflict between parties becomes the singular political difference you will reach the most extreme degree of internal political tension such that:

“The domestic, not the foreign friend-enemy grouping are decisive for armed conflict.”

Once this point is reached, civil war becomes the primary conflict.

This gives us an way to examine current political currents as we find them in the early 2020’s. During WW2 and then the Cold War there was a clear enemy to be fought. Broadly it united the west, but specifically it brought Americans together under a clear friend-enemy distinction. There were, of course, domestic political disputes. But when such clear enemies as Nazi Germany and Communist Russia were ever present threats this created a clear us-them dynamic. It had the effect of papering over any domestic disputes, allowing this conflict to clarify the political issues at stake.

This us-them consensus began to lose its potency with the Vietnam War abroad as well as the Civil Rights Era domestically. There was a brief refocusing in the aftermath World Trade Center attacks and the subsequent War on Terror. Overall though, this period from the end of the Cold War until today has been marked with growing discontents at home. There was a move among the leaders in both government and business to believe that we were moving beyond the era of conflicts between nation states towards a period of true global peace and global trade. Yet, for all the talk, the reality has been a growing dissatisfaction among the general population. This same era of globalization has brought growing economic inequality and has placed enormous downward pressure on the prosperity of the middle class across the west.

This focus on globalism has, ironically enough, tended to surface similar domestic disputes everywhere at the same time, in part because there are no external enemies to galvanize internal forces, directing them towards an external enemy. I have heard the argument made that the threat of nuclear war has also deterred normal conflicts between states from occurring, conflicts that once again may have redirected local tensions against an external enemy.

This is perhaps a long way of saying that the unintended consequences of globalization has been the removal of the external “them.” Without any external enemy we are now seeing the emergence of the true political divide of the day which is now largely internal, but internal everywhere across the west. This growing conflict is still gaining definition and clarity, but it looks like the primary dividing line is class based. There has been many attempts to define the debate. Country vs. city. Anywhere vs. somewhere. Digital vs physical. Professional managerial class vs. working class. The “us” and the “them” has not quite solidified, but that is changing. Will a catalyst be needed to galvanize these groups such that they awaken “the political?” We came very close, I think, during the recent trucker protests in Canada. You could see the beginning of a real political consciousness in this movement. This is perhaps why the government moved to seize special powers for itself, powers that have not been fully revoked now that the protest has been dispersed.

We can also analyze some of what we saw during the Covid-19 response. There was initially a clear attempt to focus everyone’s energy on banding together to fight the virus. The virus was the enemy and we need to come together to wage war against it. When this did not have the desired galvanizing effect, when it did not create a unified “us” against the virus, much of the response began to play out along existing internal political fractures, amplifying rather than dampening them.

The recent response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has played out along similar lines. Much of the political leadership class, regardless of party, has jumped on board supporting Ukraine and demonizing Russia, attempting to make the country and its leader into a clear “them” that needs to be fought by “us” with the totality of our efforts. We need to all come together around this threat. Like Covid-19, it is having some initial successes in uniting many, but I suspect that this will prove ephemeral and short lived. There is just not enough genuine fear of Russia to sustain its unifying power. Again, like Covid-19, as the efforts to contain Russia create problems domestically, it will once again focus people’s attention on the true political divide of the day. “The Political” seems to be emerging, but it is going to take some time for people to figure out who their friends are, and who the enemy is. Once people gain a consciousness of a shared way of life that is threatened by the other, that other will become the enemy and the political will emerge and with it the real present threat of violence and conflict. In a globalized world there are few alternatives to this political reality emerging.

Combat and It Real Possibility Generates “The Political”

Schmitt circles back to continue where he began this section to delve deeper yet into the determining role that conflict and war play in the formation of the political. It is the real possibility of conflict that generates the enemy concept and from that the political follows. Friend and enemy gain their real meaning precisely when they refer to real killing or its real possibility. War follows enmity. War is the negation of the enemy. War is the most extreme consequence of enmity. War does not have to be desirable, just a real possibility. As long as it is a real possibility, the concept of the political remains valid.

Just because war remains a real possibility, does not mean that we must valorize war as an ideal. We just have to recognize that it is there, that it could happen. This possibility clarifies all of a people’s interests. In this Schmitt is in direct disagreement with Clausewitz who argued that war is the continuation of politics by other means. It is not that the purpose of politics is a conversation and that war is what happens when that conversation breaks down. This is the common western liberal idea. Rather, Schmitt says that the politician has to see that he is in battle all the time, but is only occasionally as a soldier. In this sense, Schmitt reverses Clausewitz. The politics of discussion is war by other means than killing. When we engage in politics of words and discussion, war remains an ever present possibility. The ever present possibility of war clarifies interests and goals and determines the thinking of people. What actions will encourage the survival and flourishing of our people? Schmitt wants strip away many of the superfluous things that consumes domestic politics to focus on the core items related to the survival and welling-being of the people.

As a brief aside, Schmitt brings up the idea of neutrality. What happens if we as a people decide to stay out of the conflicts between other states? He argues that you can’t have neutrality without there first being a friend and an enemy whose conflict in which you are trying not to become entangled. If there was no friend-enemy distinction at work, then neutrality would end with it. In a world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, this would be a world without politics. There might be competition in such a world, but there would be not politics. He will pick this up again later, and we will be discussing it in another piece on this book, but Schmitt does not think that the end of politics is possible or even desirable.

The Transformation into the Political

Schmitt acknowledges that there are many other motives, concerns, drives and issues out there, and they do not all become political. There are religious, moral, economic, ethical or any of the other antitheses always at play in a society. He says, though, that these other issues, while not inherently political can become political if they are strong enough to group people according to “friend” and “enemy.” Economic competition can become political if it divides such that it can generate battle or war over economic issues. If the possibility of conflict is not there, then neither is the political. The key, he argues, is to clearly evaluate the concrete situation so as to distinguish the real friend and the real enemy.

I want to pause here and note that this is a big reason why American political leaders who identify as “conservative” are so bad at politics. In the absence of a real external enemy—Russia—since the end of the Cold War, they have been reluctant to actually identify real enemies. Conservatives have shifted their messaging away from actual enemies, instead focusing upon ideas. Instead of “Russia” as an enemy, we are now battling “communism.” Following 9-11, instead of a clear enemy we are fighting a tactic, the “Global War on Terror.” Sure, there are specific combatants. But these never seem to generate the existential threat necessary to go to war. We are fighting, but there is no real enemy. So, a galvanizing moment like the bringing down of the World Trade Center towers which was able to foster a very clear “us” was directed at an idea: “terror.” In fact, government messaging specifically forbade identifying specific peoples as the “other.” We were told that Islam was a religion of peace. We were fighting radical elements. Or we were cleansing the world of weapons of mass destruction. It was all very ephemeral.

Similar dynamics play out domestically, perhaps more so. We as conservatives are often fighting for things like “freedom” or “free trade” or “lower taxes” or “the constitution” or “smaller government” or “free speech” or we are against “immigration” or “gay marriage” or “abortion” or “critical race theory” or “harmful trade practices.” All of these things might be worthy policy aspirations, but they are primarily ideas. They don’t really have the capacity to bind people together. It might be fine to engage in these kinds of ephemeral domestic policy debates when you have a clear external enemy to help galvanize the people, but without that there is nothing there really to build a focused “us.”

I say this because the political left long ago learned the lessons of “the political.” The left has definite policy aspirations, but they are also willing to clearly identify who their enemies are. They fight people more than they fight for ideas. This is the essence of Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals. Take an opponent. Freeze them. Personalize the conflict, then demonize them. This is why they spend so much effort smearing their political opponents and the people who vote for them. It is why they attack the “deplorable” or the “bitter clinger.” They want to make it socially acceptable to hate, despise and look down upon their opponents. This is a reality that too few on the right have been willing to recognize. Or if they do see it, they are incapable of changing their habits. They see politics as some gentile social game being played out among the well-mannered class. A gentleman’s game played with gentleman’s manners. We don’t stoop to their level. We don’t play the politics of personal destruction.

Here is the thing: your political opponents are actually engaged in “the political.” They already have a political consciousness. They know who their “friends” are and who their “enemies” are, who the “us” is and who the “them” is. They are approaching politics as if it is a war. They are willing to demonize and attack their opponents. They are willing to use street violence to support their ends.

What if, instead of battling, say, the idea of “critical race theory,” to take a current example, and instead of trying to refute and battle the idea, we just simply attacked and demonized the teachers as real enemies of our existential way of life? If you come to this conclusion, what does it mean that you send your children away each day to be taught by the enemy? How would this change our politics? Would it clarify who the “us” is and who the “them” is? And what if we began doing this issue by issue? How would it change our policy if we battled not with “illegal immigration” but instead battled “the immigrant” as an “enemy,” a real existential threat to our way of life?

Rather than focusing on the ideas, what if we instead identified the enemies of our existence, of our way of life and treated them that way, as enemies? Or do we believe that the political left is not really an enemy of our way of life, that they are trying to achieve the same cultural goals as we are, just with different policies? If we come to the conclusion that they don’t share the same societal goals as we do, then how do we avoid the conclusion is that they are a threat to our way of life and should thus be treated as such, as an “enemy?”

Once you start asking questions around the friend-enemy distinction, a lot of cultural and policy currents start to clarify themselves in ways they were not before. It changes everything. This is what Schmitt wanted people focusing on: what are the issues core to our survival and our flourishing as a people? Are there threats to that? Are they external? Are they internal? Who is friend? Who is enemy?

“In the orientation toward the possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real enemy, the political entity is essential and it is the the decisive entity for the friend-enemy grouping; and in this it is sovereign. Otherwise, the political entity is non-existent.”

Schmitt argues that you cannot have a pluralistic society. Either it is a unified whole and there is a unity of purpose and spirit in the people, or it will be diluted and weak, dominated by other powers, or potentially heading towards civil war.

Let’s draw this to a close here. There will be one, perhaps two more pieces on this important book. Schmitt will look at the relations between states, the drive to globalization and the concept of the political and its relationship to liberalism.